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Abstract
Several systematic studies have suggested that a large fraction of published research is
not reproducible. One probable reason for low reproducibility is insufficient sample size,
resulting in low power and low positive predictive value. It has been suggested that
insufficient sample-size choice is driven by a combination of scientific competition and
‘positive publication bias’. Here we formalize this intuition in a simple model, in which
scientists choose economically rational sample sizes, balancing the cost of
experimentation with income from publication. Specifically, assuming that a scientist’s
income derives only from ‘positive’ findings (positive publication bias) and that
individual samples cost a fixed amount, allows to leverage basic statistical formulas into
an economic optimality prediction. We find that if effects have i) low base probability,
ii) small effect size or iii) low grant income per publication, then the rational
(economically optimal) sample size is small. Furthermore, for plausible distributions of
these parameters we find a robust emergence of a bimodal distribution of obtained
statistical power and low overall reproducibility rates, both matching empirical findings.
Finally, we explore conditional equivalence testing as a means to align economic
incentives with adequate sample sizes. Overall, the model describes a simple mechanism
explaining both the prevalence and the persistence of small sample sizes, and is well
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suited for empirical validation. It proposes economic rationality, or economic pressures,
as a principal driver of irreproducibility and suggests strategies to change this.
Introduction
Systematic attempts at replicating published research have produced disquietingly low
reproducibility rates, often below 50% [1–5]. A recent survey suggests that a vast
majority of scientists believe we are currently in a ’reproducibility crisis’ [6]. While the
term ’crisis’ is contested [7], the available evidence on reproducibility certainly raises
questions. One likely reason for low reproducibility rates is insufficient sample size and
resulting low statistical power and positive predictive value [8–12]. In the most
prevalent scientific statistical framework, i.e. null-hypothesis-significance-testing
(NHST), the statistical power of a study is the probability to detect a hypothesized
effect with a given sample size. Insufficient power reduces the probablity that a given
hypothesis can be supported by statistical significance. Insufficient sample sizes
therefore directly impair a scientist’s purported goal of providing evidence for a
hypothesis. Additionally, small sample sizes imply low positive predictive value (PPV ),
i.e. a low probability that a given, statistically significant finding is indeed true [8, 10].
Therefore small sample sizes undermine not only the purported goal of the individual
researcher, but also the reliability of the scientific literature in general.
Despite this, there is substantial evidence that chosen sample sizes are
overwhelmingly too small [10–15]. For instance in neuroscientific research, systematic
evaluation of meta-analyses in various subfields yielded mean power estimates of 8 to
31% [10], substantially less than the generally aspired 80%. Notably, these estimates
should be considered optimistic. This is because they are based on effect size estimates
from meta-analyses which are in turn likely to be inflated due to publication
bias [11, 16]. Remarkably, more prestigious journals appear to contain particularly small
sample sizes [11, 17, 18]. Moreover, the scientific practice of choosing insufficient sample
sizes appears to be extremely persistent, despite perennial calls for improvement since
at least 1962 [11,13,19].
Perhaps the most prominent explanation for this phenomenon is the competitive
scientific environment [6, 20,21]. Scientists must maximize the number and impact of
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publications they produce with scarce resources (time, funding) in order to secure
further funding and often, by implication, their job. For instance Smaldino and
McElreath have suggested that ’efficient’ scientists may ’farm’ significant (i.e.
publishable) results with low sample sizes [13]. This suggests that sample-size choices
may reflect an economic equilibrium or, in other words, that small sample sizes may be
economically rational. Notably, economic equilibria may be enforced not only by
rational choice but also through competitive selection mechanisms (see
discussion) [13,22,23]. The existence of an economic equilibrium of small sample sizes
would help to explain both the prevalence and the persistence of underpowering.
Recently, this economic argument has been formally explored in two related optimality
models [24,25]. While similar to the present model in spirit and conclusion, these models
contain some higher order parameters, creating challenges for empirical validation. Here,
we present a simple model, well suited to empirical validation, in which observed sample
sizes reflect an economic equilibrium. Scientists choose a sample size to maximize their
profit by balancing the cost of experimentation with the income following from
successful publications. For simplicity we assume only statistically significant ‘positive
findings’ can be published and converted to funding, reflecting ‘positive publication
bias’. The model predicts an (economically rational) equilibrium sample size (ESS ), for
a given base probability of true results (b), effect size (d), and mean grant income per
publication (IF ). We find that i) lower b leads to lower ESS , ii) greater d and IF lead
to larger ESS . For plausible parameter distributions, the model predicts a bi-modal
distribution of achieved power and reproducibility rates below 50%, both in line with
empirical findings. Finally, we explore the ability of conditional equivalence testing [26]
to address these issues and find that it leads to almost uniformly superior outcomes.
Materials and methods
Model
Economically rational scientists choose sample sizes to maximize their Profit from
science given by their Income from funding minus the Cost of experimentation (Eq.1).
For simplicity we assume they receive funding only, if they publish and they can publish
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only positive results. The first condition reflects the dependence of funding decisions on
the publication record as captured by the adage ’publish or perish’. The second
condition captures the well documented phenomenon of positive publication bias (see
Central Assumptions section below). Specifically,
Profit(s, IF , d, b) = IF × TPR(s, d, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income
− s︸︷︷︸
Cost
(1)
where IF is a positive constant reflecting mean grant income per publication (Income
Factor), TPR(s, d, b) is the total publishable rate given a sample size (s), effect size (d)
and base probability of true effects (b). The latter term (b) [27] has also been called the
’pre-study probability of a relationship being true (R/(R+ 1))’ [8]. At the same time
scientists incur the cost of experimentation which is assumed to be linearly related to
sample size (s). For simplicity we scale IF as the number of samples purchasable per
publication such that the cost of experimentation reduces to s. Accordingly, each
sample pair costs one monetary (or temporal) unit. TPR(s, d, b) is the sum of false and
true positive rates and can be calculated using basic statistical formulas [8, 27] (Eq.2):
TPR(s, d, b) = α× (1− b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
false positive rate
+ (1− β(s))× b︸ ︷︷ ︸
true positive rate
(2)
where α = 0.05 is the Type-1 and β(s) the Type-2 error and (1− β(s)) is statistical
power . The equilibrium sample size (ESS ) is then the sample size at which Profit is
maximal.
To model conditional equivalence testing (CET), we assumed the procedure
described by [26]. Briefly, all negative results are subjected to an equivalence test, to
establish if they are statistically significant negative findings. Significant negative, here,
is defined as an effect within previously determined equivalence bounds (±∆), which are
set to the ’smallest effect size of interest’ [28]. The total publishable rate for CET
(TPRCET (s, d, b,∆)) is thus the sum of TPR(s, d, b) and subsequently detected
significant negative findings (Eq.3).
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TPRCET (s, d, b, δ) = TPR(s, d, b) + αCET × b× β︸ ︷︷ ︸
false negative rate
+ (1− βCET (s, δ))× (1− b)× (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
true negative rate
(3)
where αCET = 0.05 is the Type-1 and βCET (s,∆) the Type-2 error,
(1− βCET (s,∆)) is statistical powerCET and ∆ is the equivalence bound of the
equivalence test. Note the additional correction factors β and (1− α) for the false and
true negative rates respectively, which account for the fact that the equivalence test is
performed conditionally on the lack of a previous significant positive finding. The power
of the CET (1− βCET (c,∆)) was computed using the two one sided t-tests (TOST)
procedure for independent sample t-tests using the TOSTER package in R [29]
(TOSTER::power.TOST.two with αCET = 0.05). Profit is then computed as above, but
with all published findings (TPRCET (s, d, b,∆)) instead of only positive findings
(TPR(s, d, b)) contributing to Income.
Positive predictive value (/mathitPPV ) is computed as the fraction of true
published findings to total published findings. All model code is added as supporting
information.
Central assumptions
Our model relies on three central simplifying assumptions, which here shall first be
made explicit and justified:
1. Economic equilibrium sample sizes are the result of profit maximization (i.e.
optimization).
2. Due to positive-publication-bias scientists can publish only positive results, and
receive income proportional to their publication rate.
3. Sample size is chosen for a set of parameters (b, d, IF , see table1) which are
externally given (e.g. by the research field).
The first assumption (profit maximization) can most simply be construed as rational
choice in the economic sense but may also be the outcome of competitive selection [13].
For instance if funding is stochastic, scientists who choose profit-maximizing sample
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sizes would have an increased chance of survival. In contexts, where the cost of
sampling is mainly researcher time, profit can similarly be interpreted as time. While
rational choice would depend on private estimates of the parameters (b, d, IF ),
competitive selection could operate through a process of cultural evolution, potentially
combined with social learning [13,23]. Importantly, rational choice and competitive
selection are not mutually exclusive and potentially cooperative.
The second assumption (positive publication bias), though obviously oversimplified,
seems justified as a coarse description of most competitive scientific fields [30]. Even if
negative results are published, they may not achieve high impact and translate to
funding.
The third assumption (optimization for given b, d, IF ) implies that scientists have no
agency over the base probability of a hypothesis being true (b), the true effect size (d)
or the mean income following publication (IF ). Arguably, b and d are exogenously given
by arising hypotheses and true effects while IF is likely to be an exogenous property of
a research field. Accordingly, a scientific environment with a fixed or constrained
combination of the three parameters can be thought of as a scientific niche. Note that
this does not preclude the simultaneous occupation of multiple niches by individual
scientists, for instance a high-IF/low-b niche and a high-b/low-IF niche. In combination
with the first assumption this implies that scientists choose/ learn/ are selected for
specific sample sizes within niches (but may simultaneously occupy multiple niches).
Note, that alternative models, in which choice of b is endogenized, describe similar
results [24,25].
Simulation
Simulations were performed in Python3.6 using the StatsModels toolbox [31]. Model
code is shown as supporting information. Statistical power was calculated assuming
independent, equally sized samples (s) and a two-sided, unpaired t-test given effect size
d. Note, that this implies, IF should be interpreted as the number of sample pairs
purchasable, and s indicates the size of one of the samples. We also calculated power
using a one sample t-test, where IF represents the number of individual samples, and
all results were robust. The Type-1 error (α) is assumed to be 0.05 throughout.
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Parameter Description Range
base rate (b) base rate of true positive effects (also called pre-study
probability of true effect)
0 - 1
effect size (d) cohens d (effect normalized to standard deviation) 0.1 - 1.5
Income Factor (IF ) number of sample pairs purchasable per publication 100 - 1000
Table 1. Parameter space, Input parameters to the model.
Distributions in Fig. 3 were generated using the numpy.random module. The input
distribution for d was generated using a gamma distribution tuned to match empirical
findings [11] (k = 3.5, θ = 0.2). Input distributions of b and IF were generated using
uniform or beta distributions with α and β chosen from α = (1.1, 10), β = (1.1, 10) (IF
values multiplied by 1000). Bimodal distributions were generated by mixing a low and
high skewed beta distribution (with the above parameters) with weights (0.5, 0.5,
bimodal) or weights (0.9, 0.1, low/ bimodal). From these distributions 1000 values were
drawn at random and the ESS computed for each constellation. To compute the
implied distribution of emergent power and positive predictive values, the corresponding
values for each ESS were weighted by its TPR/ESS . This corrects for the fact that
small ESS will allow to conduct more studies, but with smaller TPR. For instance, a
niche with half the ESS will allow twice the number of studies, suggesting these studies
may be twice as frequent in the literature. However, of these smaller studies, a smaller
fraction (TPR) will be significant, reducing the relative abundance of these studies in
the literature. In fact the two nearly cancel each other, such that the weighting does not
significantly affect the emergent distribution.
Results
The equilibrium sample size (ESS)
We will now first illustrate the basic model behavior with an exemplary parameter set
(b = 0.2, 0.5; d = 0.5; IF = 200). The most important model feature is the robust
emergence of an economically optimal, i.e. ’rational’, equilibrium sample size (ESS ) at
which Profit , i.e. the (indirect) Income from publications minus the Cost of
experimentation, is maximal (Fig 1). A scientist’s Income (Fig 1A, blue & green curves)
will be proportional to her publication rate, i.e. her total publishable rate (eq.2). An
optimum sample size (s) emerges because this rate must saturate close to the actual
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rate of true effects (b). Specifically, with infinite sample size and resulting infinite
power , the total publishable rate approaches the rate of actually true effects (b) plus a
fraction of false positives (α× (1− b)). The saturation and slope of the Income curve
will thus depend on b, IF and power , the latter of which is a function of sample size.
Conversely, additional samples always cost more, implying that at some sample size
additional Cost will outpace additional Income. Computing Profit for increasing
sample sizes (Eq. 1) therefore reveals an optimal sample size at which Profit is
maximal, termed the equilibrium sample size (ESS ; Fig 1B).
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Fig 1. Equilibrium Sample Size, Basic model behavior illustrated with d = 0.5,
IF = 200. A) Illustrative income (blue, green for b = 0.2, 0.5, respectively) and cost
(black) function with increasing sample size (s); MU: monetary units where one MU
buys one sample B) Profit functions for b = (0, 0.1, ..., 1). For any given b the (ESS ) is
the sample size at which profit is maximal. C) Relation of the ESS to b (black curve).
Respective ESS for b = 0.2 and 0.5 are indicated by blue and green lines. D) Statistical
power of the ESS (P(ESS)) for the given d and IF . E) Expected distribution of
statistical power at ESS if b is uniformly distributed.
At very small sample sizes, insufficient power will preclude the detection of true
positives, but income from false positives will never fall below α× IF . Increasing
sample size can then increase or decrease Profit , depending on the resulting increase in
statistically significant results. For instance if true effects are scarce (b ≤ 0.2 for Fig 1),
increasing power will only modestly increase income (Fig 1A, B, blue line), leading to
sharply decreasing Profit . In the extreme (no true effects, b = 0) increasing sample size
linearly increases Cost but the rate of statistically significant (publishable) findings
remains constant at α. The result is a range of small b at which ESS remains at the
minimal value (s = 4 in our model) (Fig 1C). While we set s = 4 as the minimal
possible sample size, the minimal publishable sample size may vary by field conventions.
The model suggests simply, that there will be an economic pressure toward the ESS .
This economic pressure should be proportional to the peakedness of the Profit curve, i.e.
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the marginal decrease in Profit when slightly deviating from ESS . As b increases from
zero the peakedness decreases until the ESS begins to rapidly shift to larger values
(between b = 0.3 and 0.4 in our example). At larger values of b peakedness increases
again and the ESS begins to saturate. Note that adding a constant overhead cost or
income per study will not affect the ESS . Such an overhead would shift the Cost curve
(Fig 1A, black) as well as the Profit curves (Fig 1B) up or down, without altering the
optimal sample size. Accordingly, we find that for a given d and IF , hypotheses with
smaller base probability, lead to smaller rational sample sizes.
Statistical power at ESS
We can now also explore the statistical power implied by the ESS (Fig 1D). It is most
helpful to separate the resultant curve into three phases: i) a range of constant small
power where ESS is minimal, ii) a small range of b (≈ 0.4 < b < 0.6) where power rises
steeply and iii) a range of large b where ESS and power saturate. Unsurprisingly, where
ESS is minimal, studies are also severely underpowered. Conversely, where ESS begins
to saturate, studies become increasingly well powered. Notably, there is only a small
range of b where moderately powered studies should emerge. In other words, for most
values of b, power should be either very low or very high. For instance, assuming a
uniform distribution of b, i.e. scientific environments with all values of b are equally
frequent, we should expect a bi-modal distribution of power (Fig 1E). If b is already
bi-modally distributed, this prediction becomes even stronger. For instance scientific
niches may be clustered around novelty driven research with small b and confirmatory
research with large b. Overall, power like ESS is positively related to b with a
distinctive three phase waveform.
Next, we explored how changing each individual input parameter (b, d and IF )
affected ESS and power (Fig 2A, B, respectively). Specifically, we tested the sensitivity
of the b to ESS and b to power relationships for plausible ranges of d and IF (Fig 2A).
The ESS for a given b should depend both on effect size d (via power) and IF (via the
relative cost of a sample). We reasoned that the majority of scientific research is likely
to be conducted in the ranges of d ∈ [0.2, 1] and IF ∈ [50, 500] (see discussion). For
small d and IF the range of small b, where ESS and power are minimal is expanded
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(Fig. 2A,B upper left panels). Conversely, both greater d and IF shift the inflection
point at which larger sample sizes become profitable rightward. Accordingly, in this
domain, above minimal sample sizes should be chosen even with small b (Fig. 2A, lower
right panels). When d and/or IF are large enough, ESS leads to well powered studies
across most values of b (Fig. 2B, lower right panels). Accordingly the distinctive
three-phase waveform is conserved throughout much of the plausible parameter space
but breaks down towards its edges. These data suggest that, ceteris paribus, a policy to
increase any of the three input parameters, individually or in combination, will tend to
promote better powered studies. For instance, increasing the funding ratio and
therewith IF or funding more confirmatory research with high b, should both lead to
better powered research.
Emergent power distributions for plausible input parameter
distributions
In real scientific settings a number of distributions of effect sizes d, income factors IF
and base probabilities b are plausible. We therefore next investigated the emergent
power distributions for multiple distributions of input parameters (Fig. 3). We then
calculated the ESS and resultant power for each random input parameter constellation
(Fig. 3A). The distribution of effect sizes was modeled after empirical data [11] with the
majority of effects in the medium to large range (Fig. 3B, see discussion). Since the
true distribution of IF is unknown, we modeled a range of distributions below
IF = 1000. We reasoned that a single publication leading to funding for 1000 sample
pairs was a conservative upper bound in view of published sample sizes [11, see
discussion]. Within this range we probed a uniform distribution as well as low, medium
and high distributions of IF . Note, that these data also demonstrate the predicted
consequences of increasing or decreasing IF . Since the true distribution of b is similarly
unknown, we first probed the uniform distribution (minimal assumption, Fig. 3C1-4)
and a bimodal distribution (assuming a cluster of exploratory fields with low b and
confirmatory fields with high b, Fig. 3C5-11). In both these cases the mean b is by
definition around 0.5, i.e. as many hypotheses are true as are false. However, many
scientific areas place an emphasis on ’novelty’ suggesting substantially lower b [8, 13, 32].
February 14, 2020 10/31
0200
E
S
S
IF 10 IF 50 IF 100 IF 200 IF 500 IF 1000
0
200
E
S
S
0
200
E
S
S
0
200
E
S
S
0 0.5 1.0
0
200
E
S
S
0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
o
w
e
r(
E
S
S
)
IF 10 IF 50 IF 100 IF 200 IF 500 IF 1000
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
o
w
e
r(
E
S
S
)
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
o
w
e
r(
E
S
S
)
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
o
w
e
r(
E
S
S
)
0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
P
o
w
e
r(
E
S
S
)
0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5 1.0
d = 0.1
d = 0.2
d = 0.5
d = 1
d = 1.5
d = 0.1
d = 0.2
d = 0.5
d = 1
d = 1.5
A
B
b b b b b b
b b b b b b
Fig 2. Effect of d and IF on ESS , A)Each individual line depicts the ESS as a
function of b for a given combination of d and IF . B) Statistical power resultant from
the ESS in panel (A).
We therefore also probed two more realistic distributions of b, namely low (most values
around 0.1, Fig. 3C9-12) and low/ bimodal (low mixed with a minor second mode with
high b (Fig. 3C13-16). The latter models a situation where most studies (90%) are
exploratory and the remaining studies are confirmatory. We found the resulting
bimodal distribution of power to be robust throughout, with only the relative weights of
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the peaks changing. Next we investigated the mean reproducibility rates which could be
expected for the resultant distributions. The positive predictive value (PPV ) measures
the probability that a positive finding is indeed true. It thus provides an upper bound
on expected reproducibility rates (as the power of reproduction studies approaches
100%, reproducibility rates will approach PPV ). Note that the PPV should be
interpreted in light of the underlying b. For instance, for the first two distributions of b
(Fig. 3C1-11), the mean base probability is already 50%, so PPV < 0.5 would indicate
performance worse than chance. For more realistic distributions of b (Fig. 3C12-16)
PPV ranged from 0.26 (Fig. 3C10) to 0.4 (Fig. 3C16), comparable to reported
reproducibility rates. Thus, for plausible parameter distributions, rational sample-size
choice robustly leads to a bimodal distribution of statistical power and expected
reproducibility rates below 50%. Additionally, these simulations suggest that creating
more research environments with high b (e.g. Fig. 3C5-8), for instance in the form of
research institutions dedicated to confirmatory research [33], should lead to larger
sample sizes and higher reproducibility. Finally, more scientific environments with large
income per publication (IF ), for instance through higher funding ratios, should lead to
better powered science and higher reproducibility rates.
Conditional equivalence testing (CET)
An additional potential strategy to address the economic pressure towards small sample
sizes is conditional equivalence testing (CET) [26,29] (Fig. 4). In CET, when a scientist
fails to find a significant positive result in the standard NHST, she continues to test if
her data statistically support a null effect (significant negative). A significant negative
is defined as an effect within previously determined equivalence bounds (±∆), which are
set to the ’smallest effect size of interest’ [28]. This addresses one of the main (and
legitimate) drivers of positive publication bias, namely that absence of (significant)
evidence is not evidence of absence [34]. Assuming that CET thus allows the
publication of statistically significant negative findings in addition to significant positive
findings implies i) an increase in the fraction of research that is published, ii) a resulting
additional source of income from publication without additional sampling cost and iii)
an additional incentive for sufficient statistical power, as we will see below.
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Fig 3. Distributions of statistical power for plausible input parameter
distributions, Random input parameter constellations were drawn from a range of
plausible, simulated distributions (grey, see methods). For each input parameter
constelation the resultant ESS and power were calculated. A) Summary of model in-
and outputs and the probed distributions. B) Empirically matched distribution of effect
sizes d [11], used for all output distribution in C. C) Emergent power distributions and
mean positive predictive values for each combination of distributions of b and IF .
A crucial step in CET is the a priori definition of an equivalence bound (±∆), below
which effects would be deemed consistent with a null-effect. While this can be
conceptually challenging in practice [28], it is important to point out that considering a
’smallest effect size of interest’ is often suggested as an implicit justification for small
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Fig 4. Conditional Equivalence Testing. Exploration of model behavior under
conditional equivalence testing. A) Basic model behavior illustrated with d = 0.5,
IF = 200,∆ = 0.5d. Left: illustrations of effect sizes that would be considered
significant postives (black) or negatives (red). Subpanels show emergent income and
cost curves (a1), resulting Profit (a2), resulting ESSCET (a3), resulting power in black
and powerCET in red (a4), and resulting power distribution given uniformly distributed
b (a5). For details see Fig 1. B) same as A but for ∆ = d. C) Statistical power in black
and powerCET in red at ESSCET for ∆ = 0.5d analogous to (a4) for various input
parameter constellations of d and IF . For details see Fig 2. D) Same as C, but for
∆ = d analogous to (b4). E) Distributions of emergent statistical power in black and
powerCET in red for plausible input parameter distributions given ∆ = 0.5d. For details
see Fig 3. F) Same as E but for ∆ = d.
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sample sizes. In the following, we explore the effects of CET given either ∆ = 0.5d or
∆ = d and α = 0.05 for both NHST and CET (Fig. 4). Defining ∆ in terms of d allows
us to consider the same range of scientific environments, with variable expectations of d
as in the previous analyses (Figs. 2, 3). If ∆ = 0.5d, a scientist is interested in detecting
an effect of size d as above, but is somewhat uncertain how smaller effect sizes
(0.5d to d) should be interpreted (Fig. 4A). However, if her data support an effect
< 0.5d she would interpret her finding as a significant negative finding and publish it as
such. The power of the CET (powerCET ) to detect a negative effect in this setting is
substantially smaller than the power of the original NHST power , leading to a second
shoulder in the income curve at higher sample sizes (Fig. 4a1). For the shown example
(∆ = 0.5d, d = 0.5, IF = 200), this does not affect the ESS (Fig. 4a2, a3) or the
resulting power to detect a positive effect (Fig. 4a4, a5, black). Note that each ESS
now implies not only a power to detect positive effect but also a powerCET to detect a
negative effect (Fig. 4a4, a5, black and red, respectively), and that even ESS with
adequate power can have low powerCET . If ∆ = d (Fig. 4B), the same procedure is
applied by the scientists, but all effects statistically significantly smaller than d will be
published as negative findings. Note that this does not imply all studies are published,
since studies with insufficient power to detect either positive or negative findings will
remain inconclusive. Ceteris paribus and ∆ = d, powerCET is comparable to the power
of the original NHST. This has two consequences: i) the income shoulders of the two
tests align, boosting profit at the respective sample size and ii) the dependency of Profit
on b was largely removed (Fig. 4b1, b2). Indeed, the added economic incentive to detect
and report significant negative findings led to an inversed relationship of b to ESS , since
more frequent true negatives (low b) implies higher potential profits from adequate
sample sizes for the CET.
Systematically probing the input parameter space (as in Fig. 2B) showed that CET
did not remove the general dependencies of power on IF or d (Fig. 4C, D). However,
the boundary region of IF and d where adequate power first becomes economical shifted
toward smaller values, particularly for small b. For instance, for IF = 100, d = 1 and
b ≤ 0.2, the power at ESS shifts from 20% to 100%. This occurred for ∆ = 0.5d (Fig.
4C) and even more prominently for ∆ = d (Fig. 4D), where the relation of b to power is
almost completely removed.
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Finally, we probed the effect of CET on various input parameter distributions,
analogous to Fig. 3 (Fig. 4E, F). We find that CET with ∆ = 0.5d leads to improved
power and PPV for most parameter distributions, but particularly for more realistic
ones (Fig. 4E, low and low/bimodal distributions of b). This is even more true when
∆ = d where PPV was at 90% or higher for all but the low IF distribution. These
results suggest that CET could be a useful tool to change the economics of sample size,
increasing not only the publication rate of negative findings but also mean statistical
power and thereby the reproducibility of positive findings.
Discussion
Here, we describe a simple model in which sample-size choice is viewed as the result of
competitive economic pressures rather than scientific deliberations (similar to [24,25]).
The model formalizes the economic optimality of small sample size for a large range of
empirically plausible parameters with minimal assumptions. Additionally, it makes
several empirically testable predictions, including a bimodal distribution of observed
statistical power. Given the simplicity of the model, the apparent similarity between its
predictions and empirically observed patterns is remarkable. Finally, our model allows
to explore a range of policy prescriptions to address insufficient sample sizes and
irreproducibility. The core model suggests any policy that increases mean funding per
publication or the rate of confirmatory research should lead to better powered studies
and increased reproducibility. Additionally, conditional equivalence testing may address
publication bias and provide an economic incentive for better powered science.
Model predictions and empirical evidence
Our core model predicts i) a correlation between base probability and sample size, ii) a
correlation between effect size and sample size, iii) a correlation between mean grant
income per publication and sample size. Moreover, for plausible parameter distributions
the model predicts iv) a bimodal distribution of achieved statistical power and v) low
overall reproducibility rates. For the purpose of discussion, it may be of particular
interest to contrast our predictions, based on economically driven sample-size choice, to
predictions derived from presumed scientifically driven sample-size choices. For instance
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scientifically driven sample-size choice might be expected to i) require larger samples for
more unlikely findings, ii) require larger samples for smaller effects and iii) be
independent of grant income. Moreover, scientifically driven sample sizes might be
expected to iv) lead to a unimodal distribution of power around 80% and v) imply
PPVs and reproducibility rates above 50%. Which sample sizes are scientifically ideal is
of course a complex question in itself, and will depend not only on the cost of sampling
but also on the scientific values of true and false positives as well as true and false
negatives. Miller and Ulrich, [35] present a scientifically normative model of sample size
choice, formalizing many of the above intuitions (however, importantly they do not
account for the possibility that negative findings may not enter the published literature).
Overall, a prevalence of underpowered research certainly leads to a range of problems,
ranging from low reproducibility rates to unreliable metaanalytic effect size
estimates [36]. Accordingly, the currently available empirical evidence appears more in
line with the economically normative than the scientifically normative account.
ad i) The available evidence suggests that journals with high impact and purportedly
more novel (low b) findings feature smaller sample sizes [11,17,18], in line with our
prediction. This finding seems particularly puzzling given the increased editorial and
scientific scrutiny such ‘high-impact’ publications receive. Accordingly, publication in a
’high-impact’ journal is generally considered a signal of quality and credibility [37].
From the perspective of an individual scientist, increasing sample size strictly increases
the probability of being able to support her hypothesis (if she believes it is true) but
does not alter the probability of rejecting it (if she expects it to be false). Similarly, a
scientific optimality model assuming true and false positive publications have equal but
opposite scientific value, suggests more unlikely findings merit larger power [35, see Fig5
therein]. All these considerations suggest high impact journals should contain larger
sample sizes, highlighting a need for explanation.
ad ii) The available evidence suggests a negative correlation between effect size and
sample size, seemingly contradicting our prediction [15,17,38]. However, the authors
caution in the interpretation of this result due to the winner’s curse
phenomenon [10,17,39]. This well documented phenomenon produces an negative
correlation between sample size and estimated effect size even when a single hypothesis
(i.e. single true effect size) is probed in multiple independent studies. It arises, because
February 14, 2020 17/31
for small sample sizes only spuriously inflated effect sizes become statistically significant
and enter the literature (also due to positive publication bias). Relating effect sizes from
meta-analyses to original sample sizes by scientific subdiscipline may help to overcome
this confound.
ad iii) We are unaware of evidence directly relating mean grant income per study to
sample size. A study by Fortin and Currie [40] suggests diminishing returns in total
impact for increasing awarded grant size. However, impact was assessed without
reference to sample sizes. Furthermore, awarded grant size does not necessarily reflect
mean grant income, since larger grants may be more competitive. Indeed, more
competitive funding systems are likely to a) increase the underlying economic pressures
and b) have additional adverse effects [41]. Indirect evidence in line with our prediction
is presented by Sassenberg and Ditrich (2019) [42]. The authors show that larger sample
sizes were associated with lower costs per sample. Since IF is expressed as ’samples
purchasable per publication’ this is analogous to higher IF correlating with greater
sample size.
ad iv) The prediction of a bimodal distribution of power is well corroborated by
evidence [10,14,15]. Particularly the lack of a mode around 80% power in our model, as
well as all empirical studies is notable. By comparison a scientific value driven model by
Miller and Ulrich [35] suggests a single broad mode at intermediate levels of power.
ad v) The predicted low overall reproducibility rates are in line with empirical data
for many fields. Two, now prominent, studies from the pharmaceutical industry
suggested reproducibility rates of 11 and 22% [1,2, respectively]. Academic studies from
psychology and experimental economics found 36, 61 and 62% [3–5, respectively]. Our
results suggest that differences in these numbers may be driven, for instance, by
different base probabilities of hypotheses being true in the different fields.
The present model thus helps to explain a range of empirical phenomena and is
amenable to closer empirical scrutiny in the future. Crucially, all in- and output
parameters are in principle empirically verifiable. Future studies could, for instance, fit
observed power distributions with the present model versus alternative formal models.
This could directly generate predictions concerning input parameters which could in
turn be empirically tested.
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Niche optimization through competitive selection
A central assumption of this model is that sample size is optimized for a given set of
parameters (b, d, IF ). One way to interpret this is that scientists make rational sample
size choices based on their estimates of these parameters for each hypothesis. As noted
above, maximizing profit in this context need not be an end in itself but can also be
seen as a strategy to secure scientific survival, given the uncertainty of both the
scientific process as well as funding decisions. Alternatively, optimization may occur by
selection mechanisms, where sample sizes are determined through a process of cultural
evolution [13]. In this case one must however make the additional assumption, that
parameters remain relatively constant within the scientific niche in which sample sizes
are selected. In such a case researchers must only associate the scientific niche with a
convention of sample size choice. These conventions could then undergo independent
evolution in each niche. Such scientific niches may correspond to scientific subdisciplines
and may indeed be identifiable on the basis of empirically consistent sample sizes. We
did not address how scientists should distribute their efforts into multiple niches (e.g.
exploratory research and confirmatory research). This question has been previously
addressed in a related optimality model [24]. The authors suggest that, given prevailing
incentives emphasizing novel research, the majority of efforts should be invested into
research with low b. This is reflected in the present model by the low skewed
distributions of b (Fig. 3C9−16). Future evolutionary models could further investigate
how mixed strategies of sample size choice perform when individual parameters vary
within niches, or scientists are uncertain of the niche.
Input parameter range estimates
We probed the arising ESS for what we judged to be plausible ranges of the three input
parameters (b, d, IF ):
The base (or pre study) probability of true results is often assumed to be small
(b < 0.1) for most fields [13,32]. This is in part because of a focus on novel research [24].
At the same time there is a small fraction of confirmatory studies, where substantial
prior evidence indicates the hypothesis should be true, and b should thus be large. We
therefore chose to cover the full range of b (b ∈ [0, 1]) in addition to some plausible
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distributions. In light of the considerations by [13] and [24], our distributions might be
judged conservative in that real values of b may be lower. Notably, models endogenizing
choice over b reach similar conclusions [24,25].
We probed a plausible range (d ∈ [0.1, 1.5]) and an empirically matched distribution
of d [11]. By comparison, in psychological research frequently cited reference points for
small, medium and large effect sizes are d = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8, respectively.
Notably our empirically matched distribution (Fig. 3B) is based on published effect
sizes, which are likely exaggerated due to the winner’s curse [17]. For instance [3, 4] find
that true effect sizes are on average only around 50 to 60% of originally published effect
sizes. This again renders our estimates conservative, in that true values may be lower.
An empirical estimate of IF is perhaps most difficult, since the full cost per sample
(time, wage, money) may be difficult to separate from other arising costs. Note that a
constant overhead cost or income, which is independent of sample size, should not alter
the optimal sample size. Nevertheless, we reasoned that plausible values for IF should
be somewhere within the range of 10 to 1000. For instance, a typically reported sample
size is 20 [10,11]. IF must allow to cover the cost of the positive result plus however
many unpublished additional samples were required to obtain it. An IF of 1000 would
thus allow for up to 49 negative findings (or 980 unpublished samples). Given that
science does not seem to provide substantial net profits, larger values for IF seem
implausible. Note, that our model assumes linearly increasing cost for increasing sample
size. We found that, for the curvature of the cost function to play a major role for ESS ,
it would need to be very prominent around the range of sample sizes where the
curvature of the power-function is strongest. For simple non-linear functions such as a
cost exponent between 0.5 and 1.1, we found model behavior to be similarly captured by
a linear cost function with adjusted slope. However, strongly non-linear cost functions
might affect ESS beyond the effect of slope (IF ).
Together, these considerations suggest that our predictions of power and expected
reproducibility rates are more likely to be over- than under estimated. Of course, the
forces affecting real sample size choices are (hopefully) not solely the economic ones
investigated here. Specifically, scientific deliberations about appropriate sample size
should at least play a partial role. Indeed, the model predicts the minimal sample size
over a wide range of parameters. This could for instance be the minimal sample size
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accepted by statistical software. Above, we have suggested it is the minimal sample size
deemed acceptable in a scientific discipline. This implies that discipline specific norms
on minimal acceptable sample sizes reflect scientific deliberations and are enforced
during the editorial and review process. Such non-economic forces may be particularly
relevant where the profit peak is broad.
Reproducibility
In our model low reproducibility rates appear purely as a result of the economic
pressures on sample size. Many additional practices, such as p-hacking, may increase
the false positive rate for a given sample size [43–47]. The economic pressures
underlying our model must be expected to also promote such practices. Moreover, many
of these practices are likely to become more relevant for many small studies. For
instance flexible data analysis will increase the probability of false positives for each
study. Moreover, in small studies substantial changes of effect size may result from
minor changes in analysis (e.g. post-hoc exclusion of data points), thus increasing the
relative power of biases. While substantial and mostly laudable efforts are being made
to reduce such practices [43,48], our approach emphasizes that scientists may in fact
have limited agency over sample size, given the economic constraints of scientific
competition. Given these constraints, our model suggests reproducibility can be
enhanced by policies that i) increase the fraction of research with higher b (e.g. more
confirmatory research), ii) lead to higher IF (e.g. higher funding rates), or iii) via the
introduction of conditional equivalence testing (CET) [26]. Several previous related
models have explored the effect of various policy prescriptions in the light of such
economic constraints [24,25]. For instance Campbell and Gustafson [25] explore the
effects of increasing requirements for statistical stringency (e.g. setting α = 0.005) as
called for by a highly publicized recent proposal [49]. However, they find that this may
dramatically lower publication rates, effectively increasing waste (unpublished research)
and competitive pressure as well as reducing the rate of ‘breakthrough findings’. While
we did not perform an extensive investigation of this policy, our model confirms that
with (α = 0.005), a large fraction of scientific niches, particularly with small (b), start
yielding net losses. Alternative proposals which directly adress the underlying economic
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pressures are very much in line with our results [26,33]. Campbell and Gustafson (2018)
propose conditional equivalence testing to increase the publication value of negative
findings. Indeed, incorporating their procedure into our model, showed that CET
should not only address publication bias, by allowing the publication of more negative
findings, but also lead to improved power and reproduciblity of positive findings. In
practice, the definition of the equivalence bounds as well as the publication and factual
monetary rewarding of negative findings, may render the adoption of CET difficult.
However, it is important to note, that even a partial adoption should promote the
predicted benefits. Moreover, these hurdles can also be addressed by funding policy.
More ambitiously, Utzerath and Fernandez [33] propose to complement the current
’discovery oriented’ system with an independent confirmatory branch of science, in
which secure funding allows scientists to assess hypotheses impartially. Indeed, such a
system may have many positive side effects. A consistent prospect of replication may
act as an incentive toward good research practices of discovery oriented scientists. An
increased number of permanent scientific positions might reduce the pressure toward
bad research practices. Additionally, the emergence of a body of confirmatory research
would allow to address many pressing meta-scientific questions, including biases in
meta-analytic effect size estimates [36], actual frequencies of true hypotheses [32] as well
as true reproducibility rates of published literature [5, 8].
Relation to proxyeconomics
Our model is consistent with, and an individual instance of, proxyeconomics [23].
Proxyeconomics refers to any competitive societal system in which an abstract goal
(here: scientific progress) is promoted using competition based on proxy measures (here:
publications). In such cases, the measures or system may become corrupted due to an
overoptimization toward the proxy measure [50–54]. As discussed above, such systems
have the general potential to create a situation of limited individual agency and
system-level lock-in [23]. The present model shows how the specific informational
deficits of a proxy allow to create pattern predictions of the potentially emergent
corruption. Specifically, an informational idiosyncrasy of the proxy (positive publication
bias) leads to a number of predictions which can be i) empirically verified, ii) contrasted
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with alternative models (see above), and iii) leveraged into policy prescriptions. A
similar pattern prediction derived from positive publication bias is the winner’s
curse [17]. Together, such pattern predictions provide concrete and compelling evidence
for competition induced corruption of proxy measures in competitive societal systems.
Conclusion
Our model strengthens the argument that economic pressures may be a principle driver
of insufficient sample sizes and irreproducibility. The underlying mechanism hinges on
the combination of positive publication bias and competitive funding. Accordingly, any
policy to address irreproducibility should explicity account for the arising economic
forces or seek to change them [25,33].
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Supporting information
S1 Model Code Model code for quick reference. Code to compute the ESS
(and associated parameters) based on b, d, IF .
import numpy as np
import s tat smode l s . s t a t s . power as getpower
alpha = 0.05
def getESS (b , d , IF ) :
”””
Calcu late ESS f o r
b : base ra te o f t rue hypotheses ( between 0 and 1) ,
d : E f f e c t s i z e (Cohen ’ s d ) ,
IF : Income f a c t o r (# of sample pa i r s purchasable per pub l i c a t i on )
”””
SS = np . arange (4 ,1000 ,2)
Power = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
falsePR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
truePR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
totalPR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
Income = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
P r o f i t = np . z e ro s ( len (SS ) )
for i , s in enumerate (SS ) :
’ ’ ’ 1−sample t−t e s t ’ ’ ’
# ana l y s i s = getpower . TTestPower ( )
# Power [ i ] = ana l y s i s . so lve power ( e f f e c t s i z e=d , nobs=s , alpha=alpha ,
# power=None , a l t e r n a t i v e =’two−s ided ’ )
’ ’ ’ 2−sample t−t e s t ’ ’ ’
a n a l y s i s = getpower . TTestIndPower ( )
Power [ i ] = ana l y s i s . so lve power ( e f f e c t s i z e=d , nobs1=s , r a t i o =1.0 , alpha=alpha ,
power=None , a l t e r n a t i v e=’ t w o - s i d e d ’ )
falsePR [ i ] = alpha ∗ (1−b)
truePR [ i ] = Power [ i ] ∗ b
totalPR [ i ] = falsePR [ i ] + truePR [ i ]
Income [ i ] = totalPR [ i ] ∗ IF
Pro f i t [ i ] = Income [ i ] − s
ESSidx = np . argmax ( P ro f i t )
ESS = SS [ ESSidx ]
SSSidx = (np . abs (Power−0 .8 ) ) . argmin ( )
SSS = SS [ SSSidx ]
TPR ESS = totalPR [ ESSidx ]
PPV ESS = truePR [ ESSidx ]/ totalPR [ ESSidx ]
PPV SSS = truePR [ SSSidx ] / totalPR [ SSSidx ]
Power ESS = Power [ ESSidx ]
’ ’ ’
ESS = equ i l i b r ium sample s i z e ( sample s i z e at which P ro f i t i s maximal )
SSS = s c i e n t i f i c a l l y appropr ia te sample s i z e ( with power=80%)
TPR ESS = to t a l pub l i shab l e ra te at ESS ( d e s c r i b e s publ i shed l i t e r a t u r e )
PPV ESS = po s i t i v e p r ed i c t i v e value at ESS
Power ESS = power at ESS
PPV SSS , p o s i t i v e p r ed i c t i v e value at SSS
Income = vector o f income f o r each t e s t ed sample s i z e
SS = vector o f t e s t ed sample s i z e s
P r o f i t = vector o f p r o f i t f o r each t e s t ed sample s i z e
’ ’ ’
return ESS , SSS , TPR ESS , PPV ESS , Power ESS , PPV SSS , Income , SS , P r o f i t
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S2 Model Code CET Model code for quick reference. Code to compute the
ESSCET (and associated parameters) based on b, d, IF ,∆ .
import numpy as np
import s tat smode l s . s t a t s . power as getpower
from rpy2 . r ob j e c t s . packages import importr
import rpy2 . r ob j e c t s as ro
alpha = 0.05
def getESS cet (b , d , IF ) :
”””
Calcu late ESS given cond i t i ona l equ iva l ence t e s t i n g f o r
b : base rate o f t rue hypotheses ( between 0 and 1) ,
d : E f f e c t s i z e (Cohens d ) ,
IF : Income f a c t o r (# of sample pa i r s purchasable per pub l i c a t i on ) and
Delta : minimally r e l evan t e f f e c t s i z e as a f r a c t i o n o f d
”””
Delta=1
SS = np . arange (4 ,1000 ,2)
Power = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
Power cet = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
falsePR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
truePR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
fa l s eNR cet = np . z e ro s ( len (SS ) )
trueNR cet = np . z e ro s ( len (SS ) )
totalPR = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
Income = np . ze ro s ( len (SS ) )
P r o f i t = np . z e ro s ( len (SS ) )
for i , s in enumerate (SS ) :
’ ’ ’ 1−sample t−t e s t ’ ’ ’
# ana l y s i s = getpower . TTestPower ( )
# Power [ i ] = ana l y s i s . so lve power ( e f f e c t s i z e=d , nobs=s , alpha=alpha ,
# power=None , a l t e r n a t i v e =’two−s ided ’ )
’ ’ ’ 2−sample t−t e s t ’ ’ ’
a n a l y s i s = getpower . TTestIndPower ( )
Power [ i ] = ana l y s i s . so lve power ( e f f e c t s i z e=d , nobs1=s , r a t i o =1.0 , alpha=alpha ,
power=None , a l t e r n a t i v e=’ t w o - s i d e d ’ )
falsePR [ i ] = alpha ∗ (1−b)
truePR [ i ] = Power [ i ] ∗ b
’ ’ ’ under cet s tud i e s not f i nd ing a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e r e s u l t
are t e s t ed f o r s i g n i f i c a n t negat ive r e su l t s , where the l a t t e r are
determined by two one−s ided t−t e s t s (TOST, Campbell and Gustafson ,
2018) . TOST power c a l c u l a t i o n from R TOSTER package ( Lakens 2017) ’ ’ ’
R command = ’ T O S T E R : : p o w e r T O S T t w o ( a l p h a = 0 . 0 5 , N = ’+str ( s)+ ’ , l o w _ e q b o u n d _ d = ’+
str(−Delta ∗d)+ ’ , h i g h _ e q b o u n d _ d = ’+str ( Delta ∗d)+ ’ ) ’
Power cet [ i ] = ro . r (R command ) [ 0 ]
f a l s eNR cet [ i ] = alpha ∗ b ∗ (1−Power [ i ] )
trueNR cet [ i ] = Power cet [ i ] ∗ (1−b) ∗ (1−alpha )
’ ’ ’ the c o r r e c t i on f a c t o r s (1−Power [ i ] ) and (1−alpha ) above account
f o r the f a c t that p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s w i l l not be sub jec ted to the
equ iva l ence t e s t . ’ ’ ’
’ ’ ’ here ( with CET) t o t a l ’ pub l i shab l e ’ ra t e i n co rpo ra t e s
s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r n a t i v e hypotheses as we l l as
s i g n i f i c a n t nu l l hypotheses ’ ’ ’
totalPR [ i ] = falsePR [ i ] + truePR [ i ] + fa l s eNR cet [ i ] + trueNR cet [ i ]
Income [ i ] = totalPR [ i ] ∗ IF
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Pro f i t [ i ] = Income [ i ] − s
ESSidx = np . argmax ( P ro f i t )
ESS = SS [ ESSidx ]
SSSidx = (np . abs (Power−0 .8 ) ) . argmin ( )
SSS = SS [ SSSidx ]
TPR ESS = totalPR [ ESSidx ]
PPV ESS = ( truePR [ ESSidx]+ trueNR cet [ ESSidx ] ) / totalPR [ ESSidx ]
P cet = Power cet [ ESSidx ]
Power ESS = Power [ ESSidx ]
’ ’ ’
ESS = equ i l i b r ium sample s i z e ( sample s i z e at which P ro f i t i s maximal )
SSS = s c i e n t i f i c a l l y appropr ia te sample s i z e ( with power=80%)
TPR ESS = to t a l pub l i shab l e ra t e at ESS ( d e s c r i b e s publ i shed l i t e r a t u r e )
PPV ESS = po s i t i v e p r ed i c t i v e value at ESS
Power ESS = power at ESS
P cet , power o f CET at ESS
Income = vector o f income f o r each t e s t ed sample s i z e
SS = vector o f t e s t ed sample s i z e s
P r o f i t = vector o f p r o f i t f o r each t e s t ed sample s i z e
’ ’ ’
return ESS , SSS , TPR ESS , PPV ESS , Power ESS , P cet , Income , SS , P r o f i t
S3 Full Code Full python code to compute the ESS (and associated parameters)
based on b, d, IF and to generate all Figures.
S4 Full Code CET Full python code to compute the ESSCET (and associated
parameters) based on b, d, IF ,∆ and to generate all Figures.
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